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A resident of Gilgit city, Dr. Salamat Ali Tabassum became the first person of GB to earn Ph.D. from Cambridge University, which is the world’s fourth-oldest surviving university and counted among the top 5 universities of the world.
Born in 1974, Dr. Salamat completed his schooling in Gilgit. At a very tender age, his father passed away, and he faced a hard life as a child, but never gave up. His struggle and hard work enabled him to complete his schooling after which he moved to Islamabad, where he completed his two years college education.
Mr. Salamat then moved to Karachi where he earned a degree of B.Sc. from the University of Karachi and the enrolled in M.Sc. Environmental Sciences at the same public university. His determination and hard work paid off when he topped his class and took home a gold medal and a presidential award from the government of Pakistan.
In 2000, he won a scholarship to do MA in Sustainable International Development at Brandies University, Boston, USA. In 2002 he completed his degree and was placed as an intern at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. Mr. Salamat then served UNESCO as a Program Specialist in Paris.
In 2007, he won a scholarship to do M.Phil. in Environment, Society and Development. On the basis of his excellent performance in M.Phil., the Cambridge University awarded him scholarship to do Ph.D., in Politics and International Relations. He completed his Ph.D. in 2014 and received his degree in 2015.
Team Mountain TV congratulates Dr. Salamat Ali on becoming the first person from GB to earn a Ph.D. from Cambridge University.
British Raj
Before the independence of Pakistan
and the partition of India in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh extended his rule to
Gilgit and Baltistan. After the partition of Pakistan and India,
Gilgit-Baltistan established in 1st Nov 1948 as an independent state, and after
governing establishing her own government, Gilgit-Baltistan aligned with
Pakistan as an independent state.
Hari Singh
- Early life
Hari Singh, a Hindu Dogra Rajput, was born on 23 September
1895 at the palace of Amar Mahal, Jammu, the only surviving son of General Raja
Sir Amar Singh Jamwal (14 January 1864 – 26 March 1909), the younger son of
General Maharajadhiraj Sri Sir Ranbir Singh and the brother of
Lieutenant-General Maharajadhiraj Sri Sir Pratap Singh, the then Maharaja of
Jammu and Kashmir.
- Education:
In 1903, Hari Singh served as a page of honour to Lord
Curzon at the grand Delhi Durbar. At the age of thirteen, Hari Singh was
dispatched to Mayo College in Ajmer. A year later, in 1909, his father died,
and the British took a keen interest in his education and appointed Major H. K.
Brar as his guardian. After Mayo College, the ruler-in-waiting went to the
British-run Imperial Cadet Corps at Dehra Dun for military training. By the age
of twenty he had been appointed as commander-in-chief of the state of Kashmir.
- Family:
v
Dharampur Rani Sri Lal Kunverba Sahiba;
married at Rajkot 7 May 1913, died during pregnancy in 1915. No child.
v
Chamba Rani Sahiba; married at Chamba 8
November 1915, died 31 January 1920. No child.
v
Maharani Dhanvant Kunveri Baiji Sahiba
(1910–19?); married at Dharampur 30 April 1923. No child.
v
Maharani Tara Devi Sahiba of
Kangra,(1910–1967); married 1928, separated 1950, one son:
v
Yuvraj (Crown Prince), i.e.,
heir-apparent Karan Singh (9 March 1931–)
Shri Badat The Cannibal King:
A few weeks
ago, I was sitting with some Hunzakutz friends in Gilgit. We were commiserating
about the irregularity of PIA plane service to Gilgit, when one of them said,
"You know, it is because of Shri Badat that the runway is not being lengthened
for jet service". Startled to hear Shri Badat's name invoked in this
context, I asked him to please explain. "Well, you see," he replied,
"The land at the end of the runway, on the other side of the Jutial road,
is the site of Shri Badat's fort. He does not want the runway to pave over his
home, so it is because of this that the runway cannot be extended".
So the legend
of Shri Badat, the Cannibal King of Gilgit, is alive even today. Who is or was
Shri Badat? Why is his legend important in Gilgit and Hunza?
Dr. G.W.
Leitner, in 1866, was the first European to record the story of Shri Badat,
which he published in 1877 as "The Historical Legend of the Origin of
Ghilghit". He noted that, "the legend … which chronicles the … rise
of Ghilghit … is not devoid of interest either from an historical or a purely
literary point of view". (Leitner 1877 III:6)
Leitner seems
to have considered the legend a mixture of fact and fiction, as evidenced by
his title and by his reference to both "historical" and "purely
literary" points of view. Yet it was the historical point of view that
drew the attention of those who came after Leitner.
Captain H.C.
Marsh visited Gilgit in 1875 where he heard the legend of "a former Raja
by name of Shirbudut" (Marsh 1876:128).
Major John
Biddulph, the first in a succession of British Political Agents to reside in
Gilgit, published "Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh" in which he asserted:
In spite of the
supernatural attributes now assigned to him, there can be no doubt that Shiri
Buddutt was a real personage; the term Shiri is doubtless the title of respect
still given to Hindu princes. (Biddulph 1880:134)
In 1905,
Munshi Ghulam Muhammad, Chief Clerk of the Political Office in Gilgit,
continued the focus on a historical identity, publishing a version of the Shri
Badat story as "Historical Folklore" (Muhammad 1905:114-115).
H.L.
Haughton, a British officer visiting Gilgit in 1913, followed precedent in
presenting another version as historical legend. (Haughton 1913: 178-179,
184-191)
Colonel Reginald
Schomberg, who visited some 20 years after Haughton, commented that:
The last ruler [of
Gilgit] reputed to have been a Hindu was Sri Badat; … he was a real person, but
has become legendary on account of his reputed cannibalism. (Schomberg
1936:249)
Colonel David
Lorimer published a version sent to him in writing by Muhammad Ghani Khan, the
son of the Mir of Hunza, which placed Shri Badat at the head of the genealogy
of the Mirs of Hunza. (Lorimer 1935:376-389)
John Clark,
while staying with the Mir of Hunza, heard a version of the Shri Badat legend,
which was described to him as "the traditional song of our [the Mir's]
dynasty … our history". (Clark 1956:175)
Professor
A.H. Dani is the latest in the series of those who focus on a historical
reality underlying the legend. Professor Dani has refined the historical point
of view, writing:
Local traditions agree
about the name of the last Buddhist ruler of Gilgit. They all call him Sri
Badad or Sri Badat. … This traditional history sounds more romantic than real.
However, it is possible to make sense out of it in the light of other historical
evidence. In the traditional name Bagartham [the name given for Shri Badat's
grandfather in one version] one could recognize Bagra or Vajra. The word
"Tham" is certainly "Thum", which, in the local language,
means "a ruler". Thus the two names Bagartham and Vajraditya appear
to be one and the same. … The last ruler, according to the Hunza Rock
Inscription, was Chandra Sri Deva Vikramaditya. He should be identified with
Sri Badad. The last known date of this ruler, according to inscriptions, is AD
749. (Dani 1989:163-164)
Indological
scholarship has long held central the search for historical origins.
Proto-languages, origins of peoples, and ur-texts are some of the concerns of
this scholarship. However, the results obtained from "attempts to discover
the representation of some historical reality" (Goldman 1984:26) behind
tales, legends, and epics should be examined carefully. The historical
specificity obtained through such exercises may hold a significance for
scholars quite apart from the significance the legends have for the people who
tell them. Apart from the ethnocentrism of such studies, they do little to
increase understanding of the development of the social reality and worldview
of the people whose legends they are. Moreover, the sometimes disastrous
results of the combination of these two separate significations should caution
us about attempts to posit a historical specificity for the figures of legend.
As an example of this volatile combination, we need only look at the
historicization of the epic of Rama and the resulting violent conflict over the
contested physical space in Ayodhya. Such examples lead us to reexamine
scholarship's historicizing tendencies and consider whether the positing of a
historical reality behind legends and epics perhaps obscures as much, if not
more, than it reveals.
As an
alternative interpretive strategy, some scholars have turned to psychology. I
have heard Shri Badat's cannibalism interpreted as a case of the
"demonization" of past history in order to validate a new social
order. That is, Shri Badat, as the last Buddhist king of Gilgit, has been
turned into a tyrant and a cannibal in order to discredit Buddhism by
demonizing the previously sacred. This interpretation, however, still retains
the central notion of the historicity of the legend, a suspect notion as I have
argued above. Furthermore, legends just don't behave in this way. Legends are
legends in part because they persist. The basic structure of a legend is not
inverted 180 degrees by the winds of change of human affairs. As a case in
point, we do not find a demonization of Rama in Muslim Malaysia. Folklore does
not readily permit its morphology to be completely restructured. The
interpretation may vary, but the morphology stays the same.
So, if we are
to abandon the historical interpretation of Shri Badat and cut it loose from
the moorings of historicity, where are we to place this intriguing legend? How
should we understand it? I believe the answer to this question lies in
understanding how the "folk" themselves understand it.
It is widely
observed that legends help people understand their own history. Hence people
often interpret their legends in historicizing ways (Pollock 1991:71). So, we
find the people of Hunza interpreting Shri Badat as the original legend of
their ruler's lineage. Oral epics and legends "derive much of their
meaning from intense engagement with the conditions of social and political
existence" (Pollock 1986:14). In Hunza, the genealogies of regicide,
parricide and fratricide accord with what we know about recent succession
history (Biddulph 1880:134-143, Mueller-Stellrecht 1981:52-53) and the Shri
Badat legend as told in Hunza supports this condition of political existence
there. We should also note that the legendary hero who married Shri Badat's
daughter and founded the line of Hunza Mirs (Biddulph 1880:135) was no mere
human, but a "fairy-born" prince, who descended to earth from another
realm. The rulers of Hunza were ascribed magical powers and held to be
"sky-born" (Ayesho in the local language Burushashki) like
the hero who routed Shri Badat. The celebration in song and ceremony (Clark
1956:175) of the overthrow of Shri Badat by his own daughter and her sky-born
husband forms a narrative about kingly power and its legitimate usage. Because
of this significance, the legend finds a place in Hunza history as a validation
of social and political conditions. John Clark shows us the legend being sung
in the royal assembly, its singing patronized by the ruler, and the ruler
sponsoring the tumshiling festival
which reenacts the legend (Clark 1956:175).
While
discussing this interpretation with Hunzakutz friends, I heard another Hunza
interpretation of the Shri Badat legend and its connection with the tumshiling festival. In
December, torches were lit in every household and carried to a central place,
where they were thrown together to form a bonfire. Just as torches were piled
around Shri Badat's fort to melt his soul/heart of butter, Hunza people would
reenact the overthrow of Shri Badat through tumshiling. (Although tumshiling is not
practiced presently, it is in the living memory of 30-year-olds.) When, my
friends told me, infant mortality rises in Hunza, people say that the soul of
Shri Badat is rising, and figuratively "eating" the infants. In such
years, the tumshiling would be
celebrated more vigourously, in order to put down the soul of Shri Badat.
From looking
at how the legend engages with social and political existence, we begin to see
that what is interesting about the legend is not a postulated historicity at
its core, but how the elements of plot and theme, the "motiphemes",
as Alan Dundes has termed them (Dundes 1962), work together to signify a social
reality for the people whose story it is.
Rather than
working to confine the legend to a specific historical location by stripping it
of its morphological texture, we can open it up to a broader significance. This
is a far more interesting pursuit, for motifs, themes, and structural
relationships between characters "participate in an international
network" (Ramanujan 1992:6), traveling widely through repeated telling.
Using the
well known Aarne-Thomson tale type index, we find the legend of Shri Badat to
be a particular instance of a well-known genre - a princess rescued from an
ogre by a hero. It is classified as AT tale type # 302 (Aarne & Thompson
1961:93-94). This tale type is common in Europe, India and China. It is also
known in Persia, though it does not occur as frequently as in India or China.
The fact that the princess of the Gilgit version is the ogre's daughter, marks
the Shri Badat legend as a distinct Indic variant (Thompson & Roberts
1960:46).
Hence, we can
state that the morphological elements of motif, theme and the identity of and
relationships between the main characters are not unique to the Gilgit legend.
What we find in using the tale type indexes are numerous examples of multiple
existence and variation. This helps us to confirm that we are not dealing with
history, but with folklore. Of course, even on the local, very specific level,
we also find this multiple existence and variation. We have at least six
versions of the Shri Badat legend for Gilgit and Hunza, and Rohit Vohra informs
us of a version in the Nubra valley of Ladakh (Vohra 1985:248).
It is ironic
that the one motif which for Biddulph and Schomberg obscured the historicity
they sought in the Shri Badat legend turns out to reveal a most interesting
broader significance of the legend. I am referring to Shri Badat's
distinguishing characteristic, his cannibalism. This is a motif in wide
circulation, especially in South Asia. Of course, for demons, ogres, or
Rakshasas, by whichever term we know them, humans have always been their main
meal. But what is food for demons is not an acceptable meal for humans, and especially
for kings. When we search for this particular motif, "Taste of Human Flesh
leads to Habitual Cannibalism", classified as motif G 36.2 in the Thompson
and Balys South Asian motif index (Thompson & Balys 1958:203), we are led
to a very interesting Pali Jataka tale (Malalasekara II 1938:573). The striking
structural congruence between the Jataka tale and the Shri Badat legend points
to a more fundamental unity between them.
In the
Jataka, we find one Brahmadatta, King of Benares, just as Shri Badat was king
in Gilgit. As Shri Badat is a demon in his present life, Brahmadatta was a
demon in a previous life. Brahmadatta unknowingly tastes human flesh, and so,
like Shri Badat, accidentally develops his cannibal habit. Brahmadatta becomes
a tyrant, like Shri Badat, demanding a daily human sacrifice to meet his desire
for human meat. Like Shri Badat, Brahmadatta's cannibalism revolts the people,
leads to an uprising, and he is driven out of his kingdom.
Brahmadatta,
as it turns out, was not a historical figure either. Rather, this was the name
of a whole line of kings (Eck 1982:54). Stories about King Brahmadatta appear
in the Kathasaritasagara, the Kashmiri Ocean of Story (Towney 1923), and many
Jataka tales begin with the stock phrase "When Brahmadatta reigned at
Benaras." (Morris 1884)
No one, as
far as I am aware, has noticed the remarkable structural congruence between
Shri Badat's story and Brahmadatta's story. Given the known previous existence
of Buddhism in Gilgit, it seems not unreasonable to assume that the Gilgit
legend is a local version of a widely known South Asian tale that came to
Gilgit in the form of the Jataka tale. My assumption of some unity between the
two tales, implicit in their structural congruence, can be made more explicit
through the congruence of the names of the two kings. The phonological
derivation of the name Badat from Brahmadatta is more plausible than the
complex phonological and semantic derivation of Badat from Vikramaditya via
Vajraditya and Bagarthum proposed by Professor Dani.
What this
evidence suggests is that we can dispense with a specific historical
interpretation of Shri Badat and posit instead that the legend is a local
version of a widely known South Asian tale. We find the tale preserved as a
Buddhist Jataka tale and as a legend in Gilgit. The Jataka tale should not be
regarded as the original source of the legend, but rather as another version of
a very common, very old story. The Jataka version is an adaption and
interpretation to suit a didactic religious purpose. Rather than limiting the
legend to an externally imposed meaning, this approach enables us to focus on
what the legend might signify in the worldview of the people who regard the
legend as their own story. The king in the Jataka tale is a cannibal and the
story of the cannibal king existed even during the heyday of Buddhism in
Gilgit. I suggest that Shri Badat never existed except in popular folklore just
as Brahmadatta in Benares never existed as an individual king.
Once we place
the Shri Badat legend within the field of folklore, we can, through
morphological analysis, explore the extent to which this particular legend
participates in a broader circulation. The story of the King's cannibalism
forms one part of the story, and the story of the hero who triumphs over the
demon king forms another part. The two parts usually occur together. When we
look at the story of the hero, of Azur Jamsher and how he overthrows Shri
Badat, we note the many parallels of motif, theme and character with an epic in
wide circulation in the Karakoram and the Himalaya, including northern
Pakistan. This is the epic of Gesar or Kisar. In the Demon of the North (bDud
'dul in Tibetan)
episode, Kisar kills a cannibal demon with the help of the demon's daughter.
She reveals to him the way in which her father can be killed, just as Shri
Badat's daughter reveals her father's secret to the young hero.
In an earlier
Kisar episode, the Heaven (Lha gling in Tibetan)
episode, Kisar is the youngest of three brothers. He enters into an archery
contest with his two elder brothers, wins, but is tricked into descending to
earth by his brothers, just as in the Shri Badat legend, Azur outdoes his two
elder brothers in archery but is then tricked by them into remaining on earth
while they return to their home in the sky.
And here I
must also briefly mention a Werchikwar text collected by Lorimer, titled
"The King Who Had Two Wives" (Lorimer 1962:322-337). This previously
unnoticed tale also contains these precise elements of motif, plot, and
character relationships as found in both the Kisar epic and the legend of Shri
Badat's overthrow by Azur Jamsher.
The fact that
these three narratives from the Gilgit-Hunza area all share the same plot,
theme, and structural relationships between characters points to a shared
typology of folklore for the high mountain regions of South and Central Asia.
But, here I enter into the topic of a separate study on the nature of the hero
in Gilgit-Hunza and Central Asian oral narratives, so I must stop with just
pointing out these most interesting parallels.
To conclude,
I suggest that we should seek the significance of folklore from within the
context in which it is told. The significance can, and does, in this case, vary
depending on the interpretive frame and social reality being validated. The
Shri Badat tale may originally have had a didactic significance as preserved in
the Jataka Brahmadatta version. In Gilgit now, in that the usurper is ascribed
a Muslim identity, the legend finds significance as an allegory of the change
from Buddhism/Hinduism to Islam and is functioning as "symbolic
language" (Ramanujan 1992:2) by which to generate a new social order. In
Hunza, the hero's role has significance as a narrative about kingly power and
the limits of its legitimate use, and the hero is principally identified as the
founder of the Mir dynasty.
Yet in every
version, from every place and time, we find the king was always a cannibal. The
hero was always a bringer of truth. Whether the hero is a sky-born prince, a
Buddhist or a Muslim depends on how the teller wishes to tell the legend and
what social order is being validated. The legend remains the same; it is the
context of interpretations that changes and so changes the meaning of the
legend.
British Raj:
Before the independence of Pakistan
and the partition of India in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh extended his rule to
Gilgit and Baltistan. After the partition of Pakistan and India,
Gilgit-Baltistan established in 1st Nov 1948 as an independent state, and after
governing establishing her own government, Gilgit-Baltistan aligned with
Pakistan as an independent state
End of the princely state:
A pro Pakistan rebellion, organized by
a mutinied Major Brown of the Gilgit Scouts overthrew Ghansara Singh, the
Governor administering the region on behalf of the British, on November 1, 1947
and temporarily installed state of their own. Raja Shah Rais Khan became the
President while Mirza Hassan Khan the Commander-in-Chief of the Gilgit scouts.
The region had run its own government for 16 days but later, on the call of
local residents unconditionally acceded to the newly established state of
Pakistan.
Part of Pakistan
1947 to 1970 Government of Pakistan
established Gilgit Agency and Baltistan Agency. In 1970 Northern areas council
established by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Gilgit Baltistan was directly
administrated by federal government and it was called FANA(Federal
administrated northern areas). In 1963, Pakistan ceded a part of Hunza-Gilgit
called Raskam and the Shaksgam Valley of Baltistan region to the China pending
settlement of the dispute over Kashmir. This ceded area is also known as the
Trans-Karakoram Tract. The Pakistani parts of Kashmir to the north and west of
the cease-fire line established at the end of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947,
or the Line of Control as it later came to be called, were divided into the
Northern Areas (72,971 km²) in the north and the Pakistani state of Azad
Kashmir (13,297 km²) in the south. The name "Northern Areas" was
first used by the United Nations to refer to the northern areas of
Kashmir.[citation needed]
Gilgit Baltistan, which was most
recently known as the Northern Areas, presently consists of seven districts,
has a population approaching one million, has an area of approximately 28,000
square miles (73,000 km2), and shares borders with China, Afghanistan, and
India.
The local Northern Light Infantry is
the army unit that participated in the 1999 Kargil conflict. More than 500
soldiers were believed to have been killed and buried in the Northern Areas in
that action.[5] Lalak Jan, a soldier from Yasin Valley, was awarded Pakistan's
most prestigious medal, the Nishan-e-Haider, for his courageous actions during
the Kargil conflict.
Self-governing status and present-day Gilgit Baltistan:
On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit
Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009, was passed by the
Pakistani cabinet and later signed by the President of Pakistan. The order
granted self-rule to the people of the former Northern Areas, now renamed Gilgit
Baltistan, by creating, among other things, an elected legislative assembly.
There has been criticism and opposition to this move in Pakistan, India, and
Gilgit Baltistan.
Gilgit Baltistan United Movement while
rejecting the new package demanded that an independent and autonomous
legislative assembly for Gilgit Baltistan should be formed with the
installation of local authoritative government as per the UNCIP resolutions,
where the people of Gilgit Baltistan will elect their president and the prime
minister.
In early September 2009, Pakistan
signed an agreement with the People's Republic of China for a mega energy
project in Gilgit–Baltistan which includes the construction of a 7,000-megawatt
dam at Bunji in the Astore District.[9] This also resulted in protest from
India, although Indian concerns were immediately rejected by Pakistan, which
claimed that the Government of India has no locus standi in the matter,
effectively ignoring the validity of the princely state's Instrument of
Accession on October 26, 1947.
On 29 September 2009, the Pakistani
Prime Minister, while addressing a huge gathering in Gilgit–Baltistan,
announced a multi-billion rupee development package aimed at the socio-economic
uplifting of people in the area. Development projects will include the areas of
education, health, agriculture, tourism and the basic needs of life.
The
Army Public School and Degree College is home to about 1100 students and staff,
most of them sons and daughters of army personnel from around Peshawar though
others attend as well. The boys and girls attend classes in different buildings
on the compound.
They
were in the middle of their school day when a car exploded behind the school Students said gunmen proceeded to walk through where
students in grades 8, 9 and 10 have classes and fired out randomly.
Seventh-grader
Mohammad Bilal said he was sitting outside his classroom taking a math test
when the gunfire erupted. He fell into bushes before running to the school's
gates to safety. Ahmed,
the 14-year-old student, remembered being in the school's auditorium when four
or five people burst in through a back door "and started rapidly
firing." After getting shot in his left shoulder, the ninth-grader lay
under a bench. "My
shoulder was peeking out of the bench, and somebody was following," Ahmed
recalled. "They went into another room, (and when) I ran to the exit, I
fell." Bajwa
told reporters that Pakistani security forces reached the school 15 minutes
after the attack began. They
found, he said, "the children ... drenched in blood, with their bodies on
top of each other." Most
of those killed were between the ages of 12 and 16, said Pervez Khattak, chief
minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, of which Peshawar is the capital. But
some adults in the school also were targets, like a 28-year-old office
assistant who was shot and then burned alive, police official Faisal Shehzad
said. By
8:30 p.m., Lady Reading Hospital had already taken in 31 dead boys, plus the
body of one of the attackers, Bilal said. Another 45 came in injured -- some
with gunshot wounds all over their bodies, though 20 were discharged within a
few hours. It
is the home base the TTP, an organization that has sought to force its
conservative version of Islam in Pakistan. They have battled Pakistani troops
and, on a number of occasions, attacked civilians as well. Peshawar,
an ancient city of more than 3 million people tucked right up against the
Khyber Pass, has often found itself in the center of it all. Militants
repeatedly targeted the city in response to Pakistani military offensives, like
a 2009 truck bombing of a popular marketplace frequented by women and children
that killed more than 100 people. And
the Taliban hasn't hesitated to go after schoolchildren. Their most notable
target is Malala Yousafzai, who was singled out and shot on October 9, 2012.
The teenage girl survived and, last week, became the youngest recipient of the
Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts to promote education and girls rights in
Pakistan and beyond.
Yousafzai
said Tuesday she was "heartbroken by this (latest) senseless and cold
blooded act of terror in Peshawar."
"Innocent
children in their school have no place in horror such as this," the
16-year-old said.
Taliban:
Revenge for killing of tribesmen
Still,
even by Pakistan and the Taliban's gruesome standards, Tuesday's attack may be
the most abominable yet.
This
is the deadliest incident inside Pakistan since October 2007, when about 139
Pakistanis died and more than 250 others were wounded in an attack near a
procession for exiled former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, according
to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database.
It
comes after some signs that peace could be possible. As recently as last
spring, the Pakistan Taliban -- a group closely affiliated with the Taliban in
Afghanistan and whose members swear allegiance to the Afghan group's leader,
Mullah Omar -- and Pakistan's government were involved in talks. The government
released 19 Taliban noncombatants in a goodwill gesture, in fact. But
talks broke down under a wave of attacks by the Taliban and mounting political
pressure to bring the violence under control.
In
September 2013, choir members and children attending Sunday school were among
81 people killed in a suicide bombing at the Protestant All Saints Church of
Pakistan. A splinter group of the Pakistan Taliban claimed responsibility for
the church attack, blaming the U.S. program of drone strikes in tribal areas of
the country.
And
for the past few months, the Pakistani military has been conducting a ground
offensive to clear out militants, a campaign that's displaced tens of thousands
of people and spurred deadly retaliations.
Khurrassani,
the Pakistan Taliban spokesman, told CNN that the latest attack was revenge for
the killing of hundreds of innocent tribesmen during repeated army operations
in provinces including South Waziristan, North Waziristan and the Khyber
Agency.
The
TTP spokesman challenged that ordinary citizens were targeted, saying that five
army vehicles are routinely stationed at the school.
"We are facing such heavy nights in routine," Khurrassani said, rationalizing the siege shortly before it ended. "Today, you must face the heavy night."
All beloved son of GB, captain (R) Mohammad Shaffi Khan has been nominated as unopposed candidate for upcoming General Elections 2015 from Yashkun community Halka III, Gilgit. We congratulate from the core of our hearts to entire community for their success to unite their tribe and community. We would like to congratulate to Mr. Muhammad Shafi Khan also for this success, and wish him best of luck in his future political career. Stay blessed and Long Live dear Sir, as you are the most favorite, reliable, Sincere, Trust-worthy and all beloved political, social and multi-dimensional personality among the candidates of GB-III election contestants.
The long-standing and continuing political alienation of
Gilgit-Baltistan has been the prime cause for growing discontent among the
local populace in this Federally Administered region (formerly referred to as
Northern Areas) of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In an apparent bid to resolve the
politico-constitutional impasse of the region, Pakistan's federal government
unanimously approved and passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and
Self-Governance Ordinance in 2009.
This ad hoc ordinance promulgated by President Asif Ali Zardari
paved way for alterations in terms of nomenclature, with Northern Areas being
referred to as Gilgit-Baltistan in the future. The Northern Areas Legislative
Council (NALC) was replaced by the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
(GBLA), the region's elected legislature, with no tangible powers at hand. The
Council, whose chairman is the Prime Minister of Pakistan and members are
appointees of the government wield the real authority. While the
"self-governance reforms package" announced the grant of "full
internal political autonomy" to the region, it lacked parliamentary
backing. Although provision for a local administration headed by a Chief
Minister has been made, both the Chief Minister and the Legislative Assembly
essentially essay the role of being rubber stamps. Besides, the executive
authority continues to rest with the federal agencies — in form of the governor
of Gilgit-Baltistan, appointed by the President of Pakistan, based on the
advice of the Prime Minister.
More significantly, the ordinance has failed to resolve the
politico-constitutional stalemate of the region. It needs to be recalled here
that Pakistan's Supreme Court declared Gilgit-Baltistan as part of the former
state of Jammu & Kashmir and not a part of Pakistan. Later, in September
1994, the Supreme Court held that since the Gilgit-Baltistan region was not
part of Pakistan, the judicial matters pertaining to it were considered to be
outside the purview of the Pakistani courts. This resulted in people belonging
to Gilgit-Baltistan being denied the right to appeal or for that matter, even access
to Pakistan's apex court. The new judicial structure has created chief courts;
however, the decision of appointing judges continues to rest with the chairman
of the Council, i.e., the Prime Minister of Pakistan. This has led to a
palpable sense of cynicism among the native population vis-Ã -vis denial of
their fundamental right to seek justice.
In fact, the constitutional deadlock of the region seems to be
becoming interminable, with Pakistan's Constitution too, not including the
formerly known Northern Areas as part of Pakistan. The population of
Gilgit-Baltistan does not possess voting rights during the national and
provincial elections in Pakistan, and resultantly has no representation in
Pakistan's National Assembly or even the Council of Ministers.
It needs to be mentioned here that until 1994, Gilgit-Baltistan
did not even have an elected assembly or municipal body. It was in the same
year that former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto promulgated the Northern Areas
Governance Order. This was rechristened as the Legal Framework Order in 2007 by
former President Pervez Musharraf. The ordinances in question here essentially
remain ad hoc in nature, not provided for with any constitutional cover.
Governance in Gilgit-Baltistan has failed to offer a sense of
belonging to the local population, rather, it only mirrors political
subjugation. There is a serious paucity in terms of employment opportunities,
with more than half the region's population living below the poverty line. The
locals require an exit permit for moving out of the area, coupled with a ban on
indigenous languages and scripts of Gilgit-Baltistan in the educational
institutions, branding them as profane. Following construction of the Karakoram
Highway in 1978, Pakistan had set up a customs post at Sost, south of the
Khunjerab Pass leading from China. The local population sternly resented this
move and adopted the slogan "no taxation without representation".
The 2009 ordinance appears to be Islamabad's latest
administrative hammer to buttress its control over the strategic hotspot.
During the process of drafting the ordinance, inputs from the local population
were not invited. Rejection of basic and fundamental socio-political rights and
modicum of actual political authority has accumulated over a period of time and
has given rise to acute sectarian strife in the region.
Revamped "self-governance" submitted by Pakistan for
Gilgit-Baltistan cannot serve as an alternative political panacea unless issues
such as constitutional abandonment and political non-representation are
addressed by Pakistan's decision-making elite. Only by virtue of providing a
protective layer to the ethnic and religious composition of the region, shall
true self-governance achieve meaning.
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly:
The Gilgit–Baltistan Legislative
Assembly is a 33-seat unicameral legislative body that was formed as part of
the Gilgit–Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, 2009 which
granted the region self-rule and an elected legislative assembly. Prior to this, the region had been
directly ruled from Islamabad.
Members:
1. Syed Mehdi Shah, Chief Minister GB., LA-7 Skardu-I,
(PPP)
2. Mr. Wazir Baig, Speaker
GBLA, LA-6 Gilgit-VI, (PPP)
3. Mr. Jamil Ahmed, Deputy
Speaker GBLA, (Tech)Gilgit, (PPP)
4. Syed Razi-ud-Din Rizvi,
LA-1 Gilgit-I, (Independent)
5. Mr. Deedar Ali, A-2
Gilgit-II, (Independent)
6. Mr. Aftab Haider, LA-3
Gilgit-III, (PPP)
7. Mr. Muhammad Ali Akhter,
LA-4 Gilgit-IV, (PPP)
8. Mr. Mirza Hussain, LA-5
Gilgit-V, (PML)
9. Mr. Nisar Hussain, LA-8
Skardu-II, (PPP)
10. F.M.Nashad,LA-8 Skardu-III
(PML N)
11. Wazir Hassan, LA-9
Skardu-III, (PPP)
12. Syed Muhammad Ali Shah,
LA-10 Skardu-IV, (PPP)
13. Raja Azam Khan, LA-12
Skardu-VI, (MQM)
14. Mr. Abdul Hameed,LA-13
Astore-I, (PPP)
15. Mr. Muhammad Naseer Khan,
LA-14 Astore-II, (PPP)
16. Mr. Bashir Ahmed, LA-14
Astore-II, (PML)
17. Mr. Janbaz Khan, LA-16
Diamer-II, (PML-N)
18. Mr. Gulbar Khan, LA-17
Diamer-III, (JUI)
19. Mr. Rahmat Khaliq, LA-18
Diamer-IV, (JUI)
20. Pir Syed Karam Ali Shah,
LA-19 Ghizer-I, (PPP)
21. Mr. Ali Madad Shah, LA-20
Ghizer-II, (PPP)
22. Mr. Muhammad Ayub Shah,
LA-21 Ghizer-III, (PPP)
23. Mr. Nawaz Khan Naji, LA-21
Ghizer-I, (BNF)
24. Mufti Muhammad Abdullah
Shah, LA-23 Ghanche-II (PML-N)
25. Mr. Muhammad Ismail, LA-24
Ghanche-III, (PPP)
26. Mr. Mutabiat Shah,
Hunza–Nagar, (PPP)
27. Mulana Sarwar Shah,
Diamer, (JUI)
28. Mst. Shreen Fatima,
Skardu,(PPP)
29. Mst. Gul Mara, Diamer,
(PPP)
30. Mst. Yasmeen Nazar,
Ghizer, (PPP)
31. Mst. Sadia Zia, Gilgit,
(PPP)
32. Mst. Amina Bibi Ansari,
Ghanche, (PML)
33. Mst. Mehnaz Wali, Gilgit,
(JUI)
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Table 1 (Gender wise)
S.No
|
Category
|
Appeared
|
Pass
|
Pass Percentage
|
|
Figure
|
Percentage
|
||||
1
|
Male
|
6084
|
53.22%
|
850
|
13.97%
|
2
|
Female
|
5347
|
46.78%
|
951
|
17.79%
|
Total
|
11431
|
100.00%
|
1801
|
15.76%
|
|
Table 2 (Institution wise)
S.No
|
Category
|
Appeared
|
Pass
|
Pass Percentage
|
|
Figure
|
Percentage
|
||||
1
|
Regular
(Government Institutions)
|
7140
|
62.46%
|
904
|
12.66%
|
2
|
Regular
(Private Institutions)
|
2979
|
26.06%
|
814
|
27.32%
|
3
|
Private
Candidates
|
1312
|
11.48%
|
83
|
6.33%
|
Total
|
11431
|
100.00%
|
1801
|
15.76%
|
|
Table 3 (Group wise)
S.No
|
Category
|
Appeared
|
Pass
|
Pass Percentage
|
|
Figure
|
Percentage
|
||||
1
|
Science Group
|
6972
|
60.99%
|
1380
|
19.79%
|
2
|
Humanities
Group
|
4459
|
39.01%
|
421
|
9.44%
|
Total
|
11431
|
100.00%
|
1801
|
15.76%
|
|
A Results
and Discussions
Table 1 Shows Gender wise pass percentage
(Female’s pass percentage is better than Male pass percentage)
Table 2 Shows Institution wise pass
percentage Private Candidate’s
result is 6.33% i.e (very Poor) and Regular
candidates from Government Institution’s result is 12.66% (Poor) but Regular candidates from Private
Institution’s result is 27.32% (Normal)
Table 3 Shows Group-wise pass percentage
Science Group result is 19.79% (Poor)
Humanities Group result is 9.44% (very Poor)
B Results and Discussions
1. Mathematics, Physics Syllabus in
SSC-I 2014 had been changed for Science and Humanities Group, properly not
taught at schools especially in govt. Schools. (12.66% result in Govt
Institutions)
2. Examination taken fair
3. Vigilance teams performed their
duties well (Control on Booti Mafia)
4. Special considerations taken
during assessment process (Called
subject specialists)
5. Well
reputed private institutions of Gilgit-Baltistan were not affiliated with KIU e.g
a Aga Khan Higher Secondary Schools in GB
b Uswa Public Schools in GB
c. Al Mustafa Public School Gilgit etc.
Conclusions
Theory as well as Practical
Examinations taken by the Teachers of Govt/Private Institutions (Affiliated
with KIU) and also assessment process carried out by the teachers of affiliated
Institutions.
KIU Examination Section provides
only logistic support to conduct the Examinations and compile the results after
assessment. So KIU is not responsible for the low percentage of result rather
intuitions have to improve their performance.
KIU is responsible to conduct fair
Examinations through surprise visits and answer scripts assessed by expert
teachers.
Therefore KIU is not
responsible for the low pass percentage.
REASONS OF LOW PASS PERCENTAGE RESULT
OF SSC-I ANNUAL EXAMINATION 2014 KIU GILGIT-BALTISTAN
1. KIU
only provides logistic support for the institutions affiliated with KIU board
and assessment process is carried out by the teacher of same affiliated
intuitions.
2. KIU
Board is responsible to conduct examinations and to compile the results after assessment by
expert teachers ( Subject specialists).
3. It
is not the result of a board rather it is performance of institutions
affiliated with KIU Board so the institutions should enhance their
performance.
4. Most
of well reputed institutions e.g. Public school & colleges, Aga Khan Higher
secondary school, Uswa Public school, Al Mustafa Public schools etc are not affiliated with KIU board.
5. Examinations
centers were continuously visited by the vigilance team of KIU due to which
Booti Mafia not able to succeed in examinations.
6. Papers
were strictly checked by the expert teachers on merit to promote the quality
product for the better future of Gilgit- Baltistan.
7. Syllabus
of subject Mathematics and Physics had been changed for Science and Humanities
Group and intuitions failed to cope with new syllabus.
8. Government
intuition’s performance is very poor only 12.66 percent students succeed which
may be due to change in syllabus of Mathematics and Physics.
9. Private
students result is only 9.44% that has
also affected overall result.
As
above mentioned reasons shows that KIU Board only facilitates institutions to
conduct the examinations and assess the paper on merit to ensure quality education.
So KIU board is not responsible for the low pass percentage. In future
Insha’Allah we will put our 100 % efforts to enhance our performance through
close collaboration with education department and other stakeholders.....
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